In the four and one-half year market recovery since the "Great Recession" there has been a remarkable transformation in the construction and analysis of corporate earnings. This is something that gives me pause for concern.
For
the past several quarters new trends are emerging in how earnings are derived
and what, exactly, they consist of.
Doubts
about the accuracy or derivation of profits can raise serious issues about the
pillars upon which current stock price appreciation is being built. While most, including myself, believe the
rally to be absolutely sustainable and real, the problems may lie in the
outlying years when true demand must ultimately be quantified into new sales.
Most
governmental analytics foresee a modest growth in corporate output starting
this year, but the market's schizophrenic behavior to start the year has some
questioning the virility of consumer spending. A scan of exogenous current events makes us
concerned that political and economic unrest amongst developed and emerging
market trading partners has placed in peril an array of potential consumers for
corporate manufacturing worldwide. Without
willing clients, the duration of any rally, any economic surge, would surely be
put at risk.
At
the same time, in order to build sales, many companies are reducing prices, and
therefore potential profits, inverting the "veracity" of earnings
acceleration patterns that they claim is occurring.
These
mixed, and sometimes confusing, signals send up a whole host of red-flags which
have the "schizophrenia-meter"
on high alert. The glass is filling up,
to be sure, maybe all the way to "half-full". But living half-full is a sorry excuse for
going full bore, believing in the
potential of profitability driven by discretionary consumer cash and
high demand for innovation and new product.
The
first, and most significant, change to earnings devolution is coming from
employment and wage data. At least in
the short-run, claiming that one is "more profitable" because you
either lay people off ("technological efficiencies") or lower their
wages is a specious argument when trying to support equity price expansion. Ultimately,
if you lose or alienate a network of potential new clients...as well as your
existing employees...you turn off a passion
for your product and/or expectations about your mission statement,
corporate governance, or the believability in your future.
Job
gains, and wage increases, go hand in hand with new product development, as
does an expanding pricing power for that innovation. For the first time in decades corporations
are suggesting profitability, at your peril, and potentially
exacerbating, certainly elongating, the cycle of probable earnings acceleration
in the future.
I
might suggest that we have extracted about as much profitability as we can out
of downsizing, restructuring, merging, and manipulating. If top-line revenue remains stagnant, it is
ill advised to impose that failure upon consumers who you rely upon to support
your enterprise. The "five year
plan" is dead in most boardrooms, and that's an argument the 24 hour
business cycle has created, but fails to comprehend.
Don't
get stuck
Investing
based upon these "popular mechanics of accounting" also has its
risks. Instead of looking at
demographics and secular shifts, some investors buy last year's hottest angels
believing they can ride its coat tails indefinitely. That is methodologically, intellectually, and
creatively bereft, setting up a recipe for failure. A herd mentality creates fewer alternatives for success, especially if one
can't apply proper diagnostics or methodologies of investing. It amounts to a market built for
"adrenaline highs", short burst enthusiasm, and a destiny of
volatility-based returns.
The
underlying weakness of failing to address long term planning is that
recoveries, booms and busts, will occur more frequently. We already had dot.com. We just went through credit collapse. I am
a believer in this market, but we now
have an economy that fails to heal, like a scab that keeps being pulled off too
soon. This might lead, I believe, to a
more profound problem of corporate accounting chicanery.
Markets
and fundamentals need time to improve, by definition. We need to allocate the right amount of
patience and compassion to planning for successful economic recovery without
imposing artificial timelines upon those who might, in fact, do the most good
in bringing that innovation and research to the people we expect them to serve.